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I. INTRODUCTION

Hugo Rafael Chdvez Frias rose to power in the midst of an era marked
by corruption at the hands of high officials and high levels of poverty.1
*

Nicole M. Bagdadi is a law student at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center,

where she is a member of the ILSA Journalof Internationaland ComparativeLaw. She received a Bachelor of
Science in Legal Studies from Nova Southeastern University in 2009. The author would like to take this
opportunity to thank her parents and her husband for their unconditional love and support The author would
also like to thank Bony Pertifiez de Simonovis for all her help in gathering information and answering questions.
This article is dedicated to Ivan Simonovis, who continues his brave fight Since the writing of this article, Mr.
Simonovis' health condition has severely deteriorated, he has presented with peritonitis, acute perforated
cholecystitis, piocolecisto and gangrene vesicular, in addition to the already present osteoporosis. Defense
counsel has requested two additional humanitarian measures in addition to the ones discussed in this article, one
in February 2013, and one in July 2013. The one requested in February was denied, and as of September 2013,
there was no decision concerning the measure requested in July of 2013, despite the precarious decline of Mr.
Simonovis' health.
1.
See generally Moises Naim, La historiade Venezuela: Lo Que se Cree Comunmente, [The
History of Venezuela: What is Commonly Believed] VENECONOMiA HEMEROTECA (shorter version of
article appeared in 2000), http://www.veneconomia.com/site/files/articulos/artEsp569 329.pdf.

556

ILSA Journalof International& Comparative Law

[Vol. 19:3

Chdvez's campaign carried an air of hope and change to those in the lower
classes.2 Promises of social programs and prosperity for the poor gained
Chdivez a large portion of the voting public, and ultimately won him the
election in 1998.'
Soon after his election, Chdvez's true colors began to show; mentored
by Fidel Castro, Chdvez brought a quasi-socialist ideology disguised as
democracy. 4 In 1999, Chdvez convened a constitutional assembly designed
to draft a new constitution that would replace the 1961 constitution.5 The
new constitution changed the presidential term from five to six years.
Further, the president could be re-elected only once, 6 such that he would
remain in power for twelve yearsby way of an arguably democratic
election.7 Despite the 12 year limit, Chdvez remained in power for over
fourteen years,8 beyond the duration allowed by the constitution enacted by
his own administration. 9

2.

See generally MINISTERIO DEL PODER POPULAR PARA LA CoMUNICACI6N E INFORMACION,

AGENDA ALTERNATIVA

BOLIVARIANA

[ALTERNATIVE BOLIVARIAN AGENDA] (2007)

available at

http://www.google.com/url?sa--t&rct-j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A
%2P/o2Fwww.alopresidente.gob.ve%2Fmaterial alo%2F 12%2F1418%2F%3Fdesc%3Dfolleto agendaboli
varina.pdf&ei=FYVwUNf4FZS09gSV5YCgCw&usg-AFQjCNGcWOqlkRk43aAc1Yt32NWwLtlZg&sig
2=81 vc_qTbTOtw28ch8xoJJA (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
3.
See generally id.; see Luis E. Lander, Venezuela. La victoria de Cheivez, El Polo
Patriotico en las elecciones de 1998 [Venezuela. Chdvez's victory, The PatrioticPole in the 1998
elections],
NUEVA
SOCIEDAD,
Mar./Apr.
1999,
at
4,
16,
available
at
http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/2749 1.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
4.
See, Reuters, Factbox: Venezuelan President Hugo Chdvez, CHICAGO TRIBUNE NEWS,
June 11, 2012, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-11/news/sns-rt-us-venezuelachavezbre85alfo-2012061 11_venezuelan-president-hugo-chavez-chavez-change-coup
(last visited
Sep. 6, 2012).
5.
Carlos M. Ayala Corao, Venezuela: De La Constituyente de 1999 a la Reforma
Constitucional de 2007 [Venezuela: From the 1999 constituent to the 2007 Constitutional Reform],
availableat, http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/6/2728/13.pdf (last visited Sep. 6, 2012).
6.
CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF THE
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], tit. 1II, ch. II, Art. 230, GACETA OFICIAL, n. 36.860, Dec.
30, 1999.
7.
See Michael Penfold, La DemocraciaSubyugada: El HiperpresidencialismoVenezolano
[Venezuela's Hyperpresidentialism:Democracy Subjugated], REV. DE CIENCIA POL., 2010, at 21, 24,
available at http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?pid=S0718-090X2010000100003&script-sci arttext (last
visited Oct. 9, 2012).
8.

See Lander, supra note 3, at 16.

9.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF THE

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], tit. 11I,
ch. fI,Art. 230, GACETA OFICIAL, n. 36.860, Dec.

30, 1999.
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This is an illustration of the Kafkaesque ° quality of the Chdivez
regime. Chdivez instituted the rule of law, purported to follow it, but in
reality, bypassed the rule of law, and acted beyond it in an effort to achieve
his purposes. As such, the Chdvez regime in Venezuela was characterized
by a systematic suppression of freedom of expression and freedom of
press", paired with a heightened state of violence and death, registering
approximately fifty-three homicides per day in 2011,12 accented by
egregious violations of human rights at the hands of his government.
All such violations were in clear opposition to the articles of the
Venezuelan Constitution 13 and the Pact of San Jose.' 4 These violations are
epitomized by the events of April 11, 200215 and their aftermath. The
repercussions of those events are still felt today by Venezuelan citizens.
Further, the regime continued to strain relations with the international
and Inter-American community. Deluded in a fantasy about an imminent
attack from the American Empire, the Chdvez regime denounced the
actions of the Inter-American Commission for 16Human Rights (IACHR)viewed by him as a puppet of the United States.

10.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S

COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 680 (1lth ed. 2006) (Kafkaesque:

having a nightmarishly complex, bizarre, or illogical quality).
11.
See, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012, 278, 280 (2012) available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr20l2.pdf (last visited Sep. 6, 2012) [hereinafter World
Report 2012] (In 2007 RCTV, a popular critical television station, was pulled from the airwaves
pursuant to a government mandate. It was subsequently replaced by a government station.).
12.
ONG: Venezuela Registr6 19.336 Asesinatos en 2011 INGO: Venezuela Registered
19,336 Homicides in 2011], ULTIMAS NOTICIAS (Dec. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/noticias/actualidad/sucesos/ong--venezuela-registro- 19-336asesinatos-en-2011 .aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Homicides in 2011].
13.
See, CONSTITUCi6N DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF
THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], tit. 1II, ch. I, GACETA OFICIAL, n. 36.860, Dec. 30,

1999.
14.
See generally, Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
"Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica" (B-32), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, U.N.T.S. 123. [Hereinafter
Pact of San Jose]
15.
See generally Iralyn Valera, 11-A-2002: El dia en que Caracas se tih6 de sangre [11
April 2002: The Day that Caracaswas Tinted in Blood], NOTICIAS 24 (Apr. 10, 2009) available at
http://www.noticias24.com/actualidad/noticia/33622/1 1-a-2002-un-dia-de-muchas-caras-y-muchasversiones/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2012) [hereinafter The Day that Caracaswas Tinted in Blood].
16.
See Chdvez quiere retirarde "inmediato" a Venezuela de la "tristemente cdlebre " CIDH
[Chdvez Wants to Immediately Retire Venezuela from the Sadly Infamous IACHR], NOTICIAS 24 (Apr.
30, 2012) available at http://www.noticias24.com/venezuela/noticia/104985/chavez-asoma-quevenezuela-podria-retirarse-de-la-cidh/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Chdvez wants to Retire
from IACHR].
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This article will analyze the gross misapplication of the law in
Venezuela during the Chdvez regime-where there remains an absence of
the rule of law that was responsible for curtailing the inalienable rights 7 of
its political prisoners following the events of April 11, 2002.18
The Human Rights Watch (HRW) recently found that the state of
affairs in Venezuela as it pertains to the socio-economic and political
situation of recent times contributed to a precarious situation in the human
rights arena.1 9 Venezuela is a country where there is no judicial
independence, freedom of speech, press, or assembly. 20 Further, the
Chdivez regime was notorious for its persecution of government dissenters
and critics. 2 1 Lastly, the government actively prevented non-governmental
organizations (NGO) from acting by pursuing legal action against such
organizations. 22
In recent years, the Chivez regime incarcerated in excess of forty
political prisoners,23 and several critics of the government have faced
criminal prosecution.2 4 This is further aggravated by the lack of an
independent judiciary, which prevents defendants from obtaining a fair
trial.25
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

April 11, 2002

April 11, 2002 began as a day filled with hope, with over one-half
million opposition protesters assembled in Parque del Este. The protesters
marched in order to voice their disappointment and disdain with the
Venezuelan government.26 They began marching along the authorized
17.
See, CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF
THE BOLlVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], tit. I, art. 1, GACETA OFICIAL, n. 36.860, Dec. 30,
1999.
18.

See generally Valera, supra note 15.

19.

World Report 2012, supra note 11, at 278.

20.

Id. at 278-82.

21.

Id. at 281.

22.

See id at 282.

23.
Ivan
Simonovis,
My
Name
is
Ivan
Simonovis,
available
http://www.ivansimonovis.com/index.php?option=comk2&view=item&id=21 :my-name-is-ivansimonovis&Itemid=53 (last visited Sept. 6, 2012) [hereinafter My Name is Ivan Simonovis].

at

24.

See World Report 2012, supra note 11, at 278, 281.

25.

See id. at 281.

26.

See Cronologiade un Vacio de Poder [Chronologyof a Lapse in Power], BBC MUNDO,
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route, and were advised that a detour to the presidential palace was not
authorized. 27 The Policia Metropolitana2 8 (PM) along with the National
Guard accompanied the protesters. These protests were captured by
television stations covering the event.29
30
Despite the warning and attempts by the PM to contain the protesters
within the bounds of the authorized route, the protesters continued toward
the presidential palace at Miraflores to ask Chdvez to resign.31 As the
opposition marched, the mayor of downtown Caracas rallied Chavistas 32 to
Llaguno Bridge along with other Chavista leaders to "secure the
[presidential] palace. 33
Hundreds of thousands of protesters marched on, peacefully as
Chavistas guarded the palace. 34 As opposition protesters neared the palace,
they were met with gunfire from snipers atop the Llaguno Bridge35 and the
roof of the Hotel Eden.36 Protesters were also met with the National Guard,
who fired tear gas and implemented force to prevent protester access to the
palace grounds.37 This iconic clash turned the peaceful protest into a
bloodbath, which would forever stain the streets of Caracas. This clash
resulted in nineteen deaths and approximately 100 38injuries .39 Afterwards,

(Apr.
5,
2007
6:23
PM)
at
1,
available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/2007/chavez/newsid-6523000/6523537.stm (last visited Sept.
6, 2012) [hereinafter Chronology of a Lapse in Power].
27.
Simonovis, et al. v. Venezuela, Case [N/A], Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., at 9,
http://www.cidh.org (2010) [hereinafter Simonovis v. Venezuela] (Ivan Simonovis personally advised
protesters of the authorized route via radio, as well as atop a stage set up at the starting point of the
protest. After speaking to protesters at the starting point, he retired to his office, where he remained
until 11:00 PM.).
28.

Metropolitan Police.

29.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 9.

30. Id. (The PM attempted to rope off passage to the presidential palace, however protesters
overtook these barriers.).
31.

The Day that Caracaswas Tinted in Blood, supra note 15, at 2.

32.

Government supporters

33.

Chronology ofa Lapse in Power,supra note 26, at 1.

34.

Id.

35.

The Day that Caracaswas Tinted in Blood, supra note 15, at 2.

36.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 9.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

See The Day that Caracaswas Tinted in Blood, supra note 15, at 5.
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it was determined that two crowd control vehicles and the armored anti-riot
vehicle of the PM were littered with 700 gunshots.4 °
While there were assurances to Venezuelan citizens that the situation
was under control, the media transmitted the gruesome images of the
Llaguno Bridge attack on a split screen; therefore, one could observe the
live images of violence in the streets of downtown Caracas. 4' The
government responded to these images by temporarily suspending private
stations' signals, such that the continuing violence could not be
transmitted.42 Afterwards, the signal was restored.4 3
As the night drew to an end, news rang out that the President had
resigned. 44 General Lucas Rinc6n appeared on television and indicated that
the president had been asked to resign, and that he had accepted.45 Soon
after, the president of Fedecamaras, Pedro Carmona Estanga, was presented
as the leader of the transitional government that was backed by military
officials. 46 Chdvez was taken to Fort Tiuna, a military base one-half
hour
47
from the presidential palace, where he was to sign his resignation.
The following morning, news was presented that Chdvez had never
resigned from power and that he was imprisoned.4 8 Subsequently, the
Attorney General, Isaias Rodriguez, called a press conference where he
indicated that a coup d'6tat had occurred and the so-called transitional
government was unconstitutional. 49 Despite these statements, Carmona
Estanga was sworn in as the interim president.50 Later, Chavistas took to
the streets in Western Caracas, demanding proof of Chdvez's resignation.51
Meanwhile, the military commenced "Operation Restoration of National
Dignity" that allowed the Chavista government officials to return to power.
Eventually, Chdvez returned to power on April 14, 2002.52

40.

See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supranote 27, at 9.

41.

Chronology of a Lapse in Power, supra note 26, at 1.

42.

See id.

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45.

Id. at 2.

46.

Chronology of a Lapse in Power, supra note 26, at 2.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.

Id.

50.

Id

51.

Chronology of a Lapse in Power, supra note 26, at 2.

52.

Id. at 3.
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B.

Prosecutionof Snipers andPolice Officials

In response to the events of April 11, 2002, the government began
parallel judicial proceedings
against the snipers of Llaguno Bridge and the
53
officials of the PM.
The proceedings against the identified snipers lasted approximately
four months and ended in their exoneration. Despite the mountains of
evidence, photographs, and footage detailing the sniper shots against the
protesters, 4 the proceedings against the police officials lasted
approximately eight years.55 This resulted in the maximum penalty allowed
by the Venezuelan Constitution. 56 Further, a defense attorney for one of the
snipers, Maikel
Moreno, subsequently acted as a judge in the case of Ivan
57
Simonovis.
III. THE CASE OF IVAN SIMONOVIS
Ivan Simonovis was fifty-three years old in April of 2001 and has been
a political prisoner of the Chdvez regime for approximately nine years.58
Mr. Simonovis worked in law enforcement for approximately twenty-three
years, and was acting as Security Commissioner at the time of the events of
April 11, 2002. 59 His mission as Security Commissioner was to improve
the people's trust in law enforcement, which had long been lost in
Venezuela because of the corruption of previous administrations. 60
On April 11, 2002, Mr. Simonovis was part of the PM.61 The PM
attempted to protect protesters on April 11, 2002.62 However, the
government, in its attempt to evade culpability, blamed the PM for the
shootings of April 11, 2002, and accused Mr. Simonovis of arming and
instructing the police force to use the weapons upon protesters.63
53.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 10.

54.

Id.

55.

See id.

56.
CONSTITUCIN DE LA REPUJBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF THE
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], art. 44, Cl. 3, GACETA OFICIAL, n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999
(Maximum penalty allowed by the constitution is thirty years).
57.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 10.

58.

See My Name is Ivan Simonovis, supra note 23.

59.

See id.

60.

See id.

61.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 10.

62.

See id. at 9.

63.

See id. at 10.
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In reality, Ivan Simonovis took to the radio and informed protesters
any route to the presidential palace was not authorized. 64 Mr. Simonovis
retired to his office until approximately 11 P.M. after having spoken to
protesters at the beginning of the protest on April 11, 2002.65
On November 22, 2004, Mr. Simonovis was planning to travel to
Atlanta when he was detained.66 He had already passed the immigration
controls, and his passport had already been stamped.6 7 Mr. Simonovis was
detained without a warrant, detention order, or any similar document or
order not to leave the country.68
Defense counsel for Mr. Simonovis was not privy to his court file until
the following day.69 Upon review of the court file, counsel noticed an arrest
order dated November 19, 2004.70 The arrest order, however, was not
present in the daily logs of the court; instead it was registered "by clerical
error" on November 22, 2004.71
An arrest without a warrant is a clear violation of Article 44 of the
Venezuelan Constitution.72 Once again, the Chdvez regime demonstrated a
blatant disregard for the rule of law.
Mr. Simonovis was not advised of his charges until more than twentyfour hours after his questionable detention.73 At that time, he was advised
that he was detained as a necessary accessory of homicide for his alleged

64.

Id at 9.

65.

Id.

66. Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 10. (Mr. Simonovis was taken into custody
under a ruse. Officers of the police, whom he knew, as he worked for that body for about 23 years, told
him that the chief needed to speak with him and took him to the police station, once they arrived, they
advised him he could not leave until he spoke with the chief Mr. Simonovis was not aware that he was
detained and not free to leave at this time.).
67.

Id.

68.

Id.

69.

Id. at 11.

70.

Id.

71.
Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 11. (Mr. Simonovis was present in Venezuela
on November 19, 2004, he could have been arrested at his place of abode, had an order been in place at
that time. Further, Mr. Simonovis appeared on a television interview, live, on November 20, 2004, and
was not arrested on that occasion either. This further evidences that there was no detention or arrest
order in place until at the day of the arrest.).
72.

CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLWVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTIUTION OF THE

BOLIVARIANREPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], art. 44, GACETA OFICIAL, n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999.Art. 44.

(Establishing that no person may be arrested or detained without warrant, unless he is caught in
flagrante delicto).
73.

See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 11.
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participation in the crimes of April 11, 2002. Additionally, he was detained
for injuries against the persons of another.74
Notably, the crimes for which Mr. Simonovis and the other police
officials were accused were imputed to all three defendants. As such, it
was not specified which defendant(s) were accused of which death and/or
injury.75 Further, the alleged actions of the PM were imputed to the police
officials.76 Mr. Simonovis, along with Lazaro Forero and Henry Vivas,77
were accused of sending orders via radio to the PM at the scene to fire
against the protesters. 78 Finally, Mr. Simonovis and the other officials were
imputed with the alleged excessive use of the firearms, pursuant to the
purported orders.79
A.

The Trial

Mr. Simonovis was subjected to a tremendously lengthy sham trial,80
that resulted in the maximum penalty allowable under the Venezuelan
Constitution. 81 The trial lasted for three years and fourteen days. The
Court in 231 hearings heard 1155 hours of testimony and analyzed
immense amounts of evidence.82
Notably, none of the evidence presented at trial provided any
connection between Mr. Simonovis and the crimes for which he was
accused.83 A crucial piece of evidence for the prosecution was a recording
of a man alleged to be Mr. Simonovis. In the recordings the "man" was

74.

Id. (26 counts).

75.

Id. at 13.

76.

Id. at 14.

77.
See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 14. (Mr. Forero and Mr. Vivas were also
police officials.).
78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80. Jos6 Luis Tamayo Rodriguez, Technical Report by the Defense Team, State v. Simonovis,
et al., CIO-138 at 2 (2011) (report on file with author). (Mr. Simonovis was subjected to a trial that
lasted 3 years and 4 months, and consisted of 231 hearings, where 235 expert reports, and approximately
5,700 photos were shown, and where 196 witnesses, and 45 experts testified.).
81.
See, CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF
THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA) [CN.], art. 44, cl. 3, GACETA OFICIAL, n. 36.860, Dec. 30,

1999.
82.
Tamayo Rodriguez, supranote 80, at 7. (The evidence in the case against Mr. Simonovis
amounted to about a 173 piece file, 72 documents, and 265 expert reports.).
83.

See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 56.
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giving orders to fire upon the crowd.8 4 However, this recording was never
authenticated.8 5 The prosecution did not analyze the recording and never
proved that the voice belonged to Mr. Simonovis. 6 The crux of the
prosecution's case was predicated upon shaky testimony of two witnesses,
Gonzalo Sanchez8 7 and Emigdio Delgado.88
These three pieces of evidence, the voice recording and the two
witnesses, were the only evidence presented to the defense team. As such,
defense counsel mounted its defense based upon this evidence alone.
However, once the trial started, the prosecutor presented extensive
evidence, without providing the relevance to the issues at hand.89
Despite the surprise maneuvers of the prosecution, the state was
unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Simonovis ordered the
PM to fire upon the protesters. 90 This, however, did not have any bearing
upon the tribunal's decision to sentence Mr. Simonovis to thirty years in
9
prison. The tribunal took the prosecutor's case at face value. 1
The defense team asserted that no criminal act was proven against Mr.
Simonovis; rather, he was detained, accused, dragged through a lengthy
trial and ultimately sentenced based upon his relationship to the former
mayor of the state of Miranda. 92 Mr. Simonovis' relationship to the mayor
of the state of Miranda was viewed as indicia of opposition to the Chdivez
regime. 93
Further, the prosecution presented fabricated evidence, asking
witnesses to revise and change their testimony in order to incriminate Mr.

84.

See id. at 48.

85.

See id.

86.

See id.

87.
See id. (Mr. Sanchez testified that he witnessed Ivan Simonovis speaking with opposition
protesters at Plaza Meritocracia.).
88.
See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 48. (The former commissioner testified that
someone told him that Mr. Simonovis had ordered the blocking of a tunnel, allegedly to prevent the
passage of a tank.).
89.
C.O.P.P. Art. 326, Cl. 5. (Establishing that the prosecution must provide the means of
proof to be presented at trial and indicate its relevance or necessity.).
90.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 48.

91.

Id.

92.
See id. at 10. (The former mayor of the state of Miranda is currently in exile as he left
Venezuela in 2004 because he was being persecuted for his dissenting views against the government,
and he was being accused of taking part in the events of April 2002.).
93.

See id. at 49.
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Simonovis.94 Those witnesses, eight police officers who had previously
given statements regarding April 11, 2002, revised their prior testimony and
each officer received a commitment reduction of their sentence. 9
These police officers renounced their private counsel and requested
public defenders that were notably closer to the government. 96 Further,
these officers requested a private hearing in which they testified against Mr.
Simonovis, recanting their prior statements.97 Counsel for Mr. Simonovis
did not receive notice of the hearing, and was unable to cross-examine these
witnesses.9 8
The prosecution asked to clarify the transcripts a mere five days before
the sentencing hearing. 99 This measure was dilatory and unnecessary since
the entire trial was recorded on video.100 Subsequently, the defense counsel
for Mr. Simonovis attempted several times to move the proceedings
forward, seeking the release of Mr. Simonovis, pending his sentencing.10
The delay by the prosecution lasted from September of 2008 until
April of 2009.102 The trial concluded on April 2, 2009,03 and nearly a year
later, the dispositive part of the sentence was announced on April 3,
2010.104

The tribunal sentenced Mr. Simonovis (and his co-defendants) to thirty
years in prison.l°5

94.

Id. at 52.

95.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 52.

96. Id. at 53. (In addition to the change of counsel, they were transferred to a different locale,
and had been visited by the prosecution before providing the new testimony.).
97.

Id.

98.

See Simonovis, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.at 53.

99.

Tamayo Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 14.

100. Id. at 14.
101.

See id. at 15.

102.

See id. at 15-17.

103.

See id. at 17.

104.

Tamayo Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 17.

105. See Tamayo Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 2 (The tribunal found Mr. Simonovis "guilty and
responsible" in the commission of necessary accessory to a homicide (3 counts), necessary accessory to
an attempted homicide (12 counts), necessary accessory in the crime of great bodily harm to the person
of another (5 counts), and necessary accessory to the crime of minor bodily harm to the person of
another (7 counts).).

566
B.
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Appeals

Counsel for Mr. Simonovis appealed his sentence in the Court of
Appeals. °6
Additionally, counsel moved for judges to recuse
10 8
themselves. 107 Incidentally, the judges denied the motion for recusal.
The next day, the judges set a hearing in reference to the merits of the
appeal.10 9 Mr. Simonovis' defense team filed an appeal in the Constitutional
Court of the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia" (TSJ) on March 18, 2010.1
The TSJ had not yet rendered a decision as of June of 2010 in regard to this
appeal. 1 2 The Court subsequently decided that the appeal was without

merit, and confirmed the thirty-year sentence, referencing the crimes
outlined in the lower court." 3
On April 27, 2010, the defense for Mr. Simonovis filed an appeal to
the Penal Cassation Court (PCC). 114 The entire file was remitted to the
court. That file consisted of 173 pieces, ninety-eight appendices, and four
boxes containing videotapes of the trial." 5 Notably, the PCC purportedly
took seven days to review the file.' 1 6 At the conclusion of the seven days,
the PCC declared that the appeal was frivolous and without merit.'
A
review of recent decisions by the PCC revealed that the average time for
review of a file and decision regarding admissibility was fifty-five days." 8

106.

Id. at 3.

107. See id. (The judges pertinent to the motion held a hearing on the motion and decided not
to recuse themselves, in violation of due process. Due process required them to find substitute judges to
hear the motion for recusal.).
108.

Id.

109.

Id.

110. See Tamayo Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 5; see Sobre el Tribunal [About the Tribunal],
TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE JUSTICIA, http://www.tsj.gov.ve/eltribunal/sobretribunal/organizacion.shtml
(The Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [Supreme Justice Tribunal] is the highest court. The constitutional
court is a tribunal within the TSJ. Cases from the constitutional court may appeal to the TSJ.).
111. See Tamayo Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 4 (The appeal was based upon violations of due
process, right to defense, violations of the right to be judged by the appropriate tribunal.).
112.

Id. at 5.

113.

Id. at 6.

114.

Id. at 7.

115.

Id.

116. Tamayo Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 7 (The file consisted of approximately 8,313 pages,
such that it would take an average reader 13 days and 12 hours of continuous reading to review.).
117.

Seeid.at8.

118. Seeid.at 12.
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The final sentence was published on May 21, 2010. Judge Mdirmol de
Le6n dissented." 9 She stated that there was a lack of motivation for the
sentence because the allegations lacked sufficient evidence that could prove
the crimes were committed. 20 Further, Mrmol de Le6n indicated that the
21
decision lacked analysis of the file and the defense arguments.'
Judge Mdrmol de Le6n further announced that there were alleged
constitutional violations, which should have prompted the court to admit
the appeal for review. 22 Specifically, the judge highlighted the omission of
the right of the accused to know why he is being sentenced in the decision
rendered by the lower court. 123 The defense team then filed a Motion for
Clarification since the appeals court did not provide an explanation
regarding the defects in the petition, which, if corrected, would make it
24
admissible.
C. Incarceration
At the time of writing this article, Mr. Simonovis had been
incarcerated since November of 2004 when he was detained, 25 and he
continued to face deplorable conditions in the Venezuelan prison where he
was incarcerated under the Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN).126 The
prison cell was reminiscent of a dungeon, 127 and his days were spent in an
improvised cell that measured approximately six foot by six foot, or four
squared meters. 128 He was locked in his cell from 10 PM to 6 AM, and
during the day he was only allowed to traverse a small hallway of
approximately ninety-one feet by three feet; a hallway that was also used by

119.

See id. at 8-9.

120.

See id.

121.

See Tamayo Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 10.

122.

See id. at 11.

123.

See id.

124. See idat 12-13. (As of the date of the report, defense counsel had not received a decision
with regard to the motion for clarification.).
125.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 20.

126.

See generally World Report 2012, supra note 11, at 283.

127. See Valentina Lares Martiz, 'Esto es una versifn actualizada de Auschwitz' ['This is a
Modem Day Version of Auschwitz], EL TIEMPO (July
1, 2012,
12:53AM),
http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/ARTICULO-WEB-NEWNOTA_INTERIOR11988183.html.
128.

Id.
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sixteen other prisoners during the day. 129 Both his cell and the hallway
were devoid of any natural light, or ventilation. 3 0 Mr. Simonovis received
approximately thirteen hours of sun over the preceding seven years as of
2010.3 His family visits 13 2 and visits from counsel 133 were also severely
34
restricted as well.1
Defense counsel has requested several times a transfer to a different
prison facility more apt to house a person for thirty years; 135 however, these
requests have been denied several times-Mr. Simonovis has remained in
this holding cell for over nine years. 136 To date, there is no hope of a
transfer to a more apt facility where he would enjoy decent living
37
conditions without a persistent threat to his health and well-being.1
D.

ConstitutionalIssues andFailureto Adhere to the Rule of Law

The Venezuelan Constitution declares that all persons are entitled to
due process.
The Constitution also guarantees fair trials by neutral
judges. 139 The government, however, has disregarded its own laws. 140 As

stated, the judge who heard and sentenced Mr. Simonovis at trial had served
as defense counsel to a militant government supporter accused of shooting
into the crowd of protesters in April, 2002.141 This judge was not fair and
impartial.

142

129. Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 20.
130. Id.
131.

Id.

132. Id. (Family visits are restricted to three visitors, only twice per week, on Thursdays and
Sundays.).
133.

Id. (Attorney visits are restricted to Mondays and Thursdays from 9:00 AM to 11:00

AM.).
134. Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 20.
135.

Id.

136. See id. at21.
137.

Seeid. at65.

138. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOL1VARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF THE
BOLIVARIANREPUBLiC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], tit. III, ch. I art. 49, n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999.
139. Id.
140. Id.; See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 4.
141.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 4.

142. See Id. ("Maikel Moreno had previously acted as defense counsel for Richard Pefialver, a
militant government supporter, who had been accused of the same crimes imputed to Ivan Simonovis.").
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Further, the IACHR has denounced Venezuela for its lack of an
independent judiciary. 143 Pursuant to a recent reform to the Venezuelan
Judicial Code in 2004, many judges were made provisional judges and over
900 were dismissed.' 44 The Judicial Commission, a super-constitutional
body, was created to execute these dismissals. 145 As such, judges in
Venezuela are subject to the whims of the147Judicial Commission. 146 Many
Venezuelan judges are political appointees.
The Human Rights Watch's 2012 World Report indicated that ChAvez
and his allies staged a political takeover, overtaking the judiciary and filling
it with government supporters. 148 This did not go unnoticed. The HRW
further asserted that the role of the judiciary has been curtailed since 2004,
and it only serves as an instrument of the government as opposed to a check
on government power for the protection of the fundamental rights of
citizens. 149 Judges have faced government censure, including imprisonment
if they rule against government interests.150
15
Due process, according to the Constitution, requires a speedy trial;
however, Mr. Simonovis' trial lasted over three years.' 52 Mr. Simonovis'
trial was the longest in recent Venezuelan history. 53 Aside from its length,
the prosecutor's dirty tactics made it nearly impossible for the defense team
The defense was without knowledge
to formulate a proper defense at trial.
54
as to the purpose of the evidence.1

143. Organization of American States, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Democracy and Human Rights
in Venezuela, at 47, OEA/Ser.L/V/H Doc. 54 (Dec. 30, 2009).
144. See World Report 2012, supra note 11, at 278; see Carmen Alguindigue & Rogelio Perez
Perdomo, The Inquisitor Strikes Back: Obstacles to the Reform of Criminal Procedure, 15 Sw. J. L. &
Trade Am 101, 119 (2008).
145.

Alguindigue, supra note 145, at 119.

146. See id.
147. Id.
148.

World Report 2012, supra note 11, at 278.

149.

Id.

150. Id.
151.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF THE

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], tit. III, ch.I, art. 49, n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999.

152.

See Tamayo Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 2.

153.

See id. at 28.

154.

See id.
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The prosecution annexed charges after the initial accusation and then
piled on a mountain of new evidence,' 55 which was not previously
disclosed. Moreover, they did not furnish
the required Statement of
56
Relevance or Necessity required by law.'
57
Further, Article 272 of the Constitution establishes prison standards. 1
As previously mentioned, Mr. Simonovis was held in a cell not fit to house
a person for thirty years. 158 The Constitution requires prison facilities to
have work, study, and recreational space. 159 Clearly, his cell measuring
four squared meters, does not comply with the constitutional mandate of
Article 272.160
E. Recent Developments
Mr. Simonovis' conditions are further heightened by his precarious
health status.' 16 In 2008, after his request for medical evaluations, Mr.
Simonovis was examined.1 62 The testing revealed that his bone density is
so far below normal levels that he has a very high risk for fractures in the
lumbar spine and femur. 163 This condition is likely attributable to his
64
deprivation of vitamin D from the sun, which is required for bone health.'
Because of Mr. Simonovis' uncertain health condition, his attorneys
filed a humanitarian measure on June 5, 2012, that would allow him to
155.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 48 (Prosecution presented 78 witness statements

and 68 documents).
156.

See C.O.P.P. Art. 326, CI. 5.

157. See CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF
THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], tit. 1I1,ch. II, art. 272, n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999.
158. See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supranote 27, at 20.

159. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF THE
BOLIVARIANREPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], tit. III, ch. II, art. 272, n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999.
160. See id.; See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supranote 27, at 20.
161. Abogado de Ivan Simonovis SolicitaraMedida Humanitariaporlas Condiciones de Salud
del Comisario [ Ivan Simonovis' Attorney will request Humanitarian Measures due to the
commissioner's Health Condition], NOTICIAS 24 (Jun. 5, 2012, 12:44 PM), available at
http://www.noticias24.com/venezuela/noticia/1 10868/abogado-de-ivan-simonovis-solicitara-medidahumanitaria-por-las-condiciones-de-salud-del-comisario/.
[hereinafter Request for Humanitarian
Measure] (Mr. Simonovis suffers from severe osteoporosis in all bones at the hip and femural level).
162. Solicitan medida humanitaria para Ivdn Simonovis [Request made for humanitarian
measure for Ivan Simonovis], EL TIEMPO (Jun. 5, 2012 9:53 AM), available at
http://eltiempo.com.ve/sucesos/medida/solicitaran-medida-humanitaria-para-ivan-simonovis/54613.
[hereinafter HumanitarianMeasurefor Simonovis]
163. Id.
164. See HumanitarianMeasurefor Simonovis, supra note 163.

Bagdadi

2013]

serve the remainder of his sentence on house arrest. 165 The government
denied the measure in an order dated June 27, 2012. The government
presented did not provide sufficient
reasoned that the medical records
166
evidence to grant the measure.
Notably, counsel for Mr. Simonovis indicated that the doctor that
examined Mr. Simonovis at his captors' request, was a gynecologist. This
would allow for the inference that the gynecologist did not have the training
an informed opinion as to the status of Mr. Simonovis' bone
to make
167
health.
The Venezuelan Constitution expressly declares that the State
168
guarantees every citizen the enjoyment and exercise of human rights.
However, the dreadful conditions of Mr. Simonovis' incarceration are
neither in accordance with human rights and human dignity, nor are they in
accordance69with human rights treaties and accords to which Venezuela is
signatory.

1

In September of 2012, Dr. Ramon Eladio Aponte Aponte, the former
magistrate of the Criminal Section of the TSJ, confessed that he transmitted
orders to the judges involved in Mr. Simonovis' case to sentence him to
thirty years "at any cost. ' ' 7 Dr. Aponte is currently in exile and being
can be
persecuted by the Venezuelan government.17' This information
72
found in a letter that Dr. Aponte wrote to Mr. Simonovis.1
In the letter, Dr. Aponte indicated that he ordered a judge in Caracas to
issue a decree for a detention order despite the fact that the issuing judge
165. See id.; See Fundepro, Lo que debo conocer una vez que mi sentencia estdfirme [What 1
at
available
(2008),
firm],
is
my
sentence
once
to
know
need
http://www.fundepro.com.ve/fundepro/PDF/Folleto%204.pdf.
166. Rogsel Castillo, Niegan medida humanitariaa Ivdn Simonovis [HumanitarianMeasure
2012),
27,
(Jun.
RADIO
UNION
Simonovis],
Ivan
to
Denied
http://www.unionradio.net/actualidadur/nota/visornota.aspx?id= 14530&tpCont-=l &idSec=3.
[Hereinafter HumanitarianMeasureDenied to Ivan Simonovis]
167.

See id.

168.

CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF THE

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], tit. III, ch. I, art. 19, n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999.
169.

See

Signatories

and

Ratifications,

ORGANIZATION

OF

AMERICAN

STATES,

http://www.oas.org/dil/ItreatiesB-32_AmericanConvention-onHuman-Rights-sign.htm#Venezuela.
[hereinafter Signatories andRatifications].
170. Letter from Dr. Eladio Ramon Aponte Aponte, former magistrate of the Penal Court of the
Supreme Justice Tribunal of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, to Ivan Simonovis, et al., former
police commissioner (Sept. 3, 2012) (on file with the author).
171.

Seeid.

172. See id.
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did not have jurisdiction to issue such an order. 73
Dr, Aponte also
indicated that he told the prosecutor to do everything in his power to delay
the proceedings. 174 Perhaps most disturbing is Dr. Aponte's assertion that
he drafted the sentence that was imposed on Mr. Simonovis. 175 Dr. Aponte
further indicated that he ordered and then drafted both the appellate judge's
and the constitutional judge's affirmation to enter similar sentences. 176
Finally, as a magistrate of the highest court, Dr. Aponte declared the
appeal "without merit" having not read the file; he indicated that he
followed orders from Chdvez to "dispose of [the case] immediately without
delay.' ' 177 Dr. Aponte instructed the other judges that Chdivez had given
such orders, and the judges affixed their signatures without question,78 with
the one notable exception of aforementioned Judge Mdrmol de Le6n.1
IV. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE

In December of 2007, Mr. Simonovis' counsel requested amnesty,
such that Mr. Simonovis would be freed.1 79 Amnesty was denied for Mr.
Simonovis.18 0 However, approximately sixty-seven of the gunmen who
shot upon throngs of protesters on April 11, 2002, were in fact given
amnesty and freed in 2007.181
V. INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-AMERICAN ISSUES

A.

Violations of the Pact of San Jose

International treaties and conferences of human rights, to which
Venezuela is a signatory, have the force of8constitutional law and shall be
applied as the law of the land by the courts. 2

173.

See id. (The case was before a court in the state of Maracay.).

174.

See id.

175.

See Aponte, supranote 171.

176. See id.
177. Id.
178.

Id. (Judge Marmol de Leon, dissenting).

179.

See Tamayo Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 23.

180. See id.
181.

See id. at25.

182.

CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REP.JBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITTION OF THE

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], tit.

HI,ch. 1,art. 23, n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999.

20131
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The Pact of San Jose was entered into force in July of 1978.183
Venezuela is a signatory to the Pact. 184 Venezuela, as a signatory,
recognized the competence and jurisdiction of the IACHR.1 85 Venezuela
agreed to respect the rights and freedoms outlined in the Pact and ensured
that all persons within its jurisdiction would enjoy these rights.18 6 One'1 87of
the rights contemplated by the Pact is the "Right to Humane Treatment."
Humane Treatment, in accordance with the Pact, refers to a person's
' 88
right to have his "physical, mental, and moral integrity respected."'
Further, Article 5 of the Pact establishes that no person may be subjected to
torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment; even while deprived of his
liberty; the person must
be treated with respect for the "inherent dignity of
189
the human person."'
As outlined by the Petition filed by defense counsel for Mr.
Simonovis, the grave human rights violations against Mr. Simonovis and
his family are in clear violation of Article 5 of the Pact. 190 Mr. Simonovis
has suffered since his incarceration and continues to suffer damage to his
person by the deplorable conditions in which he lives. 19' Such conditions
have caused damage
to his health, which, if left untreated, will cause
192
harm.
irreparable
Additionally, Mr. Simonovis' children have had to grow up without193a
father for over nine years, and his family has had to rely on one income.
In addition, Mr. Simonovis' family has to provide for his well being, as the
food at the SEBIN is inadequate. The family brings him food every day at
the prison, and provides him with medical attention for his severe
osteoporosis. 194 Additionally, the entire process from detention to trial

183.

See Signatories and Ratifications, supranote 170.

184.

See id.(Venezuela ratified the treaty on Aug. 9, 1977.).

185. See id. (Venezuela recognized the competence of the IACHR on Aug. 9, 1977, and on Jun.
24, 1981 recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.).
186. See Pact of San Jose, supra note 14, at Art. 1.
187. Pact of San Jose, supra note 14, at Art. 5.
188. Id.
189.

Id.

190. See id.
191.

See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 20.

192. See generally HumaniarianMeasurefor Simonovis, supranote 163.
193. See Simnonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 22.
194.

See id. at 32; See HumaniarianMeasurefor Simonovis, supra note 163.
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violated Article 8.1 of the Pact. 195 Mr. Simonovis' counsel requested to
subpoena witnesses that would testify that Mr. Simonovis attempted to
dissuade protesters from marching on the unauthorized route; the
prosecutor refused, without citing reasons. 196 Further, the investigation in
connection with this case was not impartial; rather, the investigation was a
ruse designed to hold someone accountable for the events of April 11,
2002.'9'

The trial of Mr. Simonovis was also in violation of Article 8.5 of the
Pact. 198 In the case of Mr. Simonovis, private hearings were held without
justification for the furtherance of justice in accordance with the Pact. 99 In
these private hearings, Mr. Simonovis was prevented from cross-examining
and confronting his accusers and the witnesses used against him. His
counsel was not present because the prosecution failed to notify counsel of
the hearings. 200 Further, Mr. Simonovis was not allowed to exercise his
right to testify on his own behalf, which is allowed by Venezuelan law.20 '
This was in violation of the Pact, the Constitution, and the Penal Process
Code.2 °2
Mr. Simonovis was not entitled to a presumption of innocence in
violation of Article 8.2 of the Pact.20 3 The presumption of innocence was
derogated with the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant. 2°

195. Pact of San Jose, supra note 14, Art. 8.1 (Article 8.1 of the Pact establishes that every
person has the right to a hearing within a reasonable time by an impartial court in presenting any
accusation of a crime against him or when determining his rights and obligations.).
196. Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 36.
197. Id.
198. Pact of San Jose, supra note 14, Art. 8.5 (Article 8.5 of the Pact of San Jose states that
"[c]riminal proceedings shall be public" unless necessary to protect the interest ofjustice.).
199. Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 38.
200. Id.
201.

See id.; see C.O.P.P. Art. 130.

202. See Pact of San Jose, supra note 14, Art. 8.5; CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA
BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], art.
49, cl. 3, n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999; See C.O.P.P. Art. 130 (Article 130 of the Penal Process Code
establishes that a defendant may testify before the prosecutor as long as it is spontaneous, the defendant
requests to do so, or he is subpoenaed by the prosecutor. Additionally, this article establishes that a
defendant may abstain from testifying or testify as many times as he sees fit, as long as the testimony is
pertinent and not a dilatory measure.).
203. Pact of San Jose, supra note 14, Art. 8.2 (Article 8.2 of the Pact of San Jose establishes
that all accused persons are entitled to a presumption of innocence as long as their guilt has not been
proven by law.).
204.

See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 50.
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The evidence presented by the prosecution did not meet the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 5 Finally, the lack of a presumption of
innocence is also in violation of the Venezuelan Constitution.2 6
Mr. Simonovis was not advised of the actual charges against him until
January of 2005.207 Article 8.2(b) of the Pact requires that a defendant
receive prior notification in detail of the charges against him. 20 8 Such
notification would enable the defendant sufficient time to prepare his
defense.20 9 Subsequently, in March of 2006, prosecutors added additional
charges that included deaths and injuries under "new circumstances." 2 10
Defense counsel prepared to defend the initial charges; however, they did
not have sufficient time to prepare a proper defense for the additional
charges brought in March. 211 As such, this forced the defense team to
212
prepare a new defense within an unreasonably short amount of time.
This action by the prosecutors violated the provisions of the Pact that
grant the accused a right to know the charges against him and prepare a
Any violations of the Pact of San Jose are indeed
defense.213
unconstitutional because the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela establishes that any international treaty to which the State is a
signatory has the force of law and shall be implemented as the law of the
land.214

205.

See id. at 39.

206.

CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONsTnvTION OF THE

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], GACETA OFICIAL [G.O]. n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999 Art. 49,

CI. 2 (Art. 49, Cl. 2 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela establishes that all
persons are presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.).
207. Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 46 (In January of 2005 the prosecutor
formulated a formal accusation of Mr. Simonovis charging him with the commission of the crimes of
necessary accessory to homicide and injuries to the person of others citing as reasoning the allegation
that his subordinates fired upon the crowd on April 11, 2002 pursuant to orders from the accused, and
such subordinates made excessive use of the firearms provided them by their superiors, including Ivan
Simonovis.).
208.

Pact of San Jose, supranote 14, Art. 8.2.

209.

Id. (Article 8.2(c) of the Pact establishes that a defendant must have adequate time and

means for the preparation of his defense.).
210.

Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27, at 47.

211.

Id.

212.

Id.

213.

Pact of San Jose, supra note 14, Art. 8.2.

214. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPOBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITION OF THE
BOLIVARIANREPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [CN.], GACETA OFICIAL [G.O]. n. 36.860, Dec. 30, 1999 Art. 23.
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Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

Counsel for Mr. Simonovis filed a petition before the IACHR on
November 10, 20 10.215 The petition outlined the human rights violations to
the person of Ivan Simonovis, and requested provisional relief from the
IACHR or in the alternative, precautionary measures 2 16 against the
Venezuelan government to remedy the violations.2 17
The defense team for Mr. Simonovis requested precautionary
measures with regard to his current place of incarceration and impending
transfer. 218 Mr. Simonovis was a police official. In that position he
apprehended countless criminals who are incarcerated throughout the
country. 219 Therefore, his transfer to any of these prisons presents an
immediate threat to the health and well being of Mr. Simonovis.22 °
Additionally, any common prison to which he may be transferred is located
over two hours from his former residence, preventing his family from
22 1
visiting Mr. Simonovis.
Mr. Simonovis was transferred to Ramo Verde prison in 2013.222
Such transfer was precipitated by his precarious health conditions.22 3 In
late July of 2013, Mr. Simonovis was transported to a medical facility
22
where he underwent emergency surgery for peritonitis.224
Eleven days
following the surgery, he was transferred to Ramo Verde prison, a facility

215.

See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supra note 27 at 1.

216.

INTER AM. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, ABOUT PRECAUTIONARY

MEASURES,
www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp
(last visited Aug. 4, 2012)
(Precautionary measures are used by the IACHR in order to prevent irreparable harm to the party
alleging human rights violations while the case is pending before the court, and attempt to preserve the
party's human rights.).
217.

See Simonovis v. Venezuela, supranote 27, at 1.

218. Id. at 69.
219.

Id.at 62.

220.

See id.

221.

Id. at 65.

222.

Trasladarona Simonovis a la cdrcel Ramo Verde [Simonovis Transferredto Ramo Verde

Prison], EL NACIONAL, Aug. 6, 2013, http://www.el-nacional.com/sucesos/Trasladaron-Simonovis-

carcel-Ramo-Verde_0_240576215.html.
223.

See id.

224. Ivdn Simonovis fue operado de peritonitis [Ivan Simonovis underwent operation for
peritonitis], EL NACIONAL,

July 27,

operado-peritonitis_0234576541 .html.

2013, http://www.el-nacional.com/politica/lvan-Simonovis-

2013]
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that is not equipped to house a prisoner recuperating from emergency
surgery.225
Prisons in Venezuela are among the most violent on the continent.226
The Venezuelan prison system is characterized by poor infrastructure, weak
security measures, and corruption.22 7 In recent times, several prison riots
have resulted in the death or injury of hundreds of prisoners.228 Further,
weapons are easily accessible to inmates. 2 29 To date, the IACHR has taken
no measures to remedy the human rights violations to the person of Ivan
Simonovis.2 30 However, in 2005, Raul Jose Diaz Pefia was granted a
request for precautionary measures directing the State to carry out medical
exams, and transfer Mr. Diaz to a detention center where he could enjoy
decent living conditions.231
C.

Recent Developments

In April of 2012, Chivez commenced advocating Venezuela's exit
from the IACHR.2 32 He proclaimed that a study would be done to ascertain
the consequences and benefits of leaving the IACHR 3
Chivez

225. Simonovis Tranfer to Ramo Verde Prison,supra note 223.
226.

World Report 2012, supra note 11, at 283.

227. Id.
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/n oticias/2012/08/120820-venezuela-carceles-violencia-yareaz.shtml.
229. See id.
230. E-mail from Maria Isabel Rivero, Press and Broadcasting Director, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., to author (Aug. 10, 2012, 10:57 EST) (on file with author) (Inquiry into the IACHR press office
revealed that there is no new information available to the public in reference to this case. The press
office also indicated that the preliminary decision with regard to the process is confidential and
unavailable to the public. Further, the press office indicated that such a decision usually takes about 30
months. Once this decision has been reached, the IACHR decides admissibility, and that may take a
year or more, depending on the case.).
231. Diaz v. Venezuela, Case 1133-05, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 23/09,
OEA/Ser.L. (2009), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009sp/Venezuela1 133-05.sp.htm
(According to the precautionary measure reported by the IACHR, Mr. Diaz was housed in the same
facility as Mr. Simonovis, and the IACHR granted a precautionary measure directing the state to carry
out medical exams to assess Mr. Diaz's health, and transfer him to a detention center to provide him
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maintained that the IACHR was a puppet of the United States, and he
threatened to leave the IACHR on several occasions.3
In order to leave the IACHR, Venezuela would have to denounce the
Pact of San Jose, which was signed in 1969 and has the force of
constitutional law at this time. 23 5 The relations between Venezuela and the
IACHR are tense. Chdvez had not allowed the IACHR to visit Venezuela
since 2002.236 Chdvez asserted that the reason for not allowing the
Commission to visit was that it recognized the super-constitutional
government established upon the coup d'6tat of 2002.237 Subsequently, on
July 24, 2012, Chdvez reiterated his intent to exit from the IACHR. 238 Any
attempt or success at withdrawal from the IACHR by Venezuela will likely
further the global concern over the precarious human rights situation in
Venezuela, and will likely dispel the myth of democracy in Venezuela and
unveil the pseudo-socialist regime.239
Chavez also rejected a call for a jail inquiry by the IACHR.24 ° In light
of the recent prison violence outbreaks, deaths, and injuries, the JACHR
sought an inquiry as to prison conditions. 241 The ambassador to the United
States from Venezuela rejected the call for inquiry on May 23, 2012.242
Additionally, the IACHR has expressed concern about statements by high
public officials with regard to the work of NGO.243
As recently as October of 2011, several governments have expressed
concern at the precarious human rights situation in Venezuela. 24 At the
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UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review of Venezuela, the
Venezuelan government accepted several recommendations; however, it
also rejected several key recommendations with regard to the protection of
free speech, remedying the lack of judicial independence, and compliance
with the IACHR rulings.245
VI. CONCLUSION

The Venezuelan government formerly headed by Hugo Chdvez
effectively eviscerated the rule of law in Venezuela. Even in the early days
of the regime, Chdvez sought to change the existing laws.246 He succeeded

and subsequently instituted a new constitution by December of 1999.247

While in power, Chaves made changes to the judiciary, the Penal Code, the
Penal Process Code, and enacted countless organic laws by decree. a48
However, despite the fact that his regime enacted the laws, there is still a
blatant disregard for the Constitution and the rule of law.249
A constitutional assembly full of Chdvez's supporters wrote the new
Constitution. 250 Today, despite Chaves no longer being in control, it is
clear that the government does not follow any laws, rather opting to
persecute political opponents and dissenters through extra constitutional
means.
The government not only has a blatant disregard for the national
Constitution, but has ignored the long-standing international and interAmerican treaties and accords to which Venezuela is a signatory.252
Further, the government's blatant disregard for domestic and
international law has furthered a precarious human rights atmosphere,
wherein a person's inalienable rights are stripped from them without regard
to due process. Additionally, the freedom of speech, press, and assembly is
severely restricted, so much so that television stations that speak against the
government have been shut down and replaced with state-sponsored
stations that transmit state-approved programming.253
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The disregard for the rule of law has also increased the violence in the
streets and within the prison system. 25 Venezuela has become one of the
most violent countries on the continent, reporting approximately fifty-three
homicides per day in 2011.255 Additionally, prison riots have claimed the
lives of hundreds and injured many more.2 56 The violence in the streets has
continued so long as the government supporters have perpetuated it.
The government is a self-regulating entity. The recourse available to
citizens who are affected by human rights violations at the hands of
government officials is through the TSJ. 257 However, the TSJ is no longer a
neutral body as it acts within the control of the president. 8
Ultimately, the Constitution provides that no person may be subjected
to inhumane or cruel treatment, 25 9 and that every incarcerated person must
be treated with the respect that a human being deserves.26
In its
characteristic manner, the government of Venezuela has disregarded this
law. The treatment that Mr. Simonovis has received in the nine years of his
incarceration is nothing short of cruel and inhumane.
The ruse of a state under the rule of law in Venezuela is further eroded
by the fact that innocent people are put through sham trials and stripped of
their liberty. Trials riddled with incoherent, shaky, and irrelevant evidence,
presented before a partial and biased tribunal, are not fair.261
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261. In February of 2013, counsel for Mr. Simonovis requested a humanitarian measure, again.
Said measure was again denied. The forensic doctor indicated at the hearing on the measure that Mr.
Simonovis' health condition was not sufficiently severe as to warrant the grant of a humanitarian
measure. Subsequently, counsel for Mr. Simonovis filed an appeal of the decision denying the measure.
This appeal was denied in April of 2013, such that Mr. Simonovis continues to be imprisoned.
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